Sunday, November 7

Where is the TRICK???

simple are feelings once unveiled
simply irrational they are by definition
complicated is affection when doubtful
much complicated it gets if cheated
restlessly patient tends to be hope along the way
risky and blind are emotions by themselves - irrational

turned up we feel when we meet somebody unreasonably attractive
turned around we are when we want to believe - human nature can't always oppose itself to stomach cramps as emotional disquiet
playful we state to be often
mocked we end up sometimes
encouraged and straight-forward we may be at the beginning
discouraged and self-protective we find ourselves inevitably once discovered the trick...

In Signalling Games the Sender (S) has a certain "natural" type and observes it.
The Receiver (R) does not know the type of the sender.
Based on his own knowledge, (S) chooses to send a message from a set of possible ones.
(R) observes the message but not the type of the sender.
Then (R) chooses an action from a set of feasible actions.
The two players receive payoffs dependent on the Sender's type, the message chosen by the Sender and the action chosen by the Receiver...

Under what conditions honest signalling can be an equilibrium of the game?
Under what conditions can we expect rational people to reveal information about their types?

Suppose a Signaler can be either starving or just hungry, and he can signal that fact to another individual which has food. Suppose that he would like more food, but that the individual with food only wants to give him the food if he is starving.
While both players have identical interests when the Signaler is starving, they have opposing interests when he is only hungry.When the Signaler is hungry he has an incentive to lie about his need in order to obtain the food.
And if the Signaler regularly lies, then the Receiver should ignore the signal and do whatever she thinks best.

CASE 1, both parties have coinciding interest - they both prefer the same outcomes in all situations - then honesty is an equilibrium.
(Although - in exceptional cases - non-communicative equilbria exist as well - really???)
CASE 2, the parties' interests do not perfectly overlap, then the maintenance of informative signaling systems raises an important problem...

Mathematics always gives us "answers", then...
DO ENJOY some GAME THEORY ;-) my Friends: NEXT!!!


Anonymous said...

So true!!!

Calcetín said...

A ver si escribes en cristiano!!! con lo bonito que habría quedado esto en italiano, francés, español o incluso latín...